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Abstract   This paper explores the interaction that may exist between national
fisheries management regimes through international markets for fisheries prod-
ucts. A two-stage, two-period model is developed in which the fishing industries
of a “domestic” country and a “foreign” country harvest identical fisheries
products, from separate fish stocks, for the same international market. The do-
mestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate its fishing industry in each
period, while the foreign fishing industry is unregulated. Two types of fisheries
are considered: schooling fisheries and search fisheries. Given these two types
of fisheries, it is shown that the domestic country may choose a conservative
harvest policy in the first period in order to induce further degradation, or even
destruction, of the foreign fishery in the second period. The results suggest that
fisheries trade in the presence of international market power and divergent na-
tional fisheries management regimes could have unexpected consequences for
world fisheries.
Key words   Fisheries management regimes, international trade, strategic behavior.
Introduction
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which entered into force in
1994 but has been accepted as customary international law since 1982, has already
had profound effects on global patterns of fisheries production and trade. While it
has created well-defined international property rights over most of the world’s fish-
eries, the new Law of the Sea has also transferred international market power in
fisheries products from former distant-water fishing countries to coastal countries. It
was expected that these effects would provide sufficient incentive for coastal coun-
tries to implement efficient fisheries management regimes within their exclusive
economic zones (EEZs). However, only a handful of countries have moved toward
more efficient management of their fisheries, while the fishing industries in most
countries have undergone rapid and unregulated expansion. There has been much
concern that international fisheries trade in the presence of inefficient national fish-
eries management regimes could jeopardize the goal of world fisheries conservation
that had been intended with the new Law of the Sea. This paper explores the interac-
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tion that may exist between national fisheries management regimes through interna-
tional markets for fisheries products.
The paper develops a two-stage, two-period model of a “domestic” country and
a “foreign” country whose respective fishing industries harvest identical fisheries
products, from separate fish stocks, for the same international market.1 The domestic
and foreign harvests in each period are determined by the zero-profit condition of
open access to each fishery. The domestic country uses a harvest policy to regulate
its fishing industry in each period, while the foreign fishing industry is unregulated.
The domestic country chooses the level of its harvest policy in each period with the
objective of maximizing domestic surplus (or domestic economic rent) from fishing.
Since there is no harvest policy in the foreign country, the foreign surplus from fish-
ing is zero. Thus, there is an efficient management regime in the domestic fishery
and an inefficient management regime in the foreign fishery.2 The timing of the two-
stage game in each period is as follows. In the first stage, the domestic country
chooses the level of its harvest policy, and in the second stage, the fishing industries
in both countries harvest simultaneously. The model is solved for the subgame per-
fect equilibrium domestic harvest policy and harvest by domestic and foreign fish-
ing industries in each period.
Naturally, the direct role of the domestic harvest policy is to induce an efficient
domestic harvest in each period, but there can also be two indirect or strategic roles:
(i) to raise domestic surplus from fishing through rent-shifting in the international
market in each period; and (ii) to induce even more foreign overfishing through the
international market in the first period, thereby further raising domestic surplus
from fishing in the second period. The first of these strategic roles produces the
standard terms of trade argument for government intervention in the presence of in-
ternational market power at the industry level.3 However, depending on the type of
fishery in each country, the second of these strategic roles can produce rather strik-
ing results. In the case of schooling fisheries, the domestic country may choose a
conservative harvest policy in the first period in order to induce biological collapse
of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the case of search fisheries, the do-
mestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first period in or-
der to induce further economic degradation, or even economic collapse, of the for-
eign fishery in the second period.
This paper draws from the literature on trade policy in the presence of interna-
tional rivalries between industries. Brander and Spencer (1985) and Dixit (1984) ex-
amine the strategic role of government intervention in a two-country model of an
oligopolistic international market with a fixed number of firms in each country. The
optimal domestic harvest policy in the second period of the model developed in this
paper is similar to the optimal export policy in Dixit, but the optimal domestic har-
vest policy in the first period can be quite different under certain circumstances.
Barbier and Rauscher (1994), Brander and Djajic (1983), and Brander and Taylor
(1997) consider the potential roles of various trade policies that involve resource in-
dustries. One common theme in this literature is that trade policies can be used by
countries to improve the global efficiency of resource exploitation. This paper de-
velops the opposite theme in the sense that strategic behavior by the domestic coun-
1 There is neither a biological interaction nor a physical interaction between the domestic and foreign
fisheries; there is only an economic interaction through the international market for their identical fish-
eries products.
2 While the foreign management regime is deemed inefficient due to the absence of a foreign harvest
policy, this could be the result of a rational choice by the foreign country if management and enforce-
ment costs are prohibitively high.
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try in the form of a conservative harvest policy can exacerbate the problem of
overexploitation of the foreign fishery, or it can even lead to its destruction.
This paper also draws from the literature on strategic interactions between the
resource industries of different countries. While Ruseski (1998) examines the role of
government intervention in the context of international fisheries, this paper exam-
ines the role of government intervention in the context of international markets for
fisheries products. Similarly, while Copeland (1990) considers the strategic incen-
tive for countries to underinvest in international fisheries, this paper considers the
strategic incentive for countries to overinvest in nationally owned fisheries in order
to induce further overexploitation or even destruction of fisheries in other countries.
The notion of strategic interaction between countries in current and future markets
for resource products has been considered by Salant (1976) and Gilbert (1978) in
their studies of the structure of the world oil industry. The notion of fisheries con-
servation in anticipation of more profitable market conditions in the future has been
explored in the nonautonomous dynamic models of Clark and Munro (1975, 1978).
Finally, the strategic behavior considered in this paper is similar, in some respects,
to intra-industry conduct by firms that raises rivals’ costs (Salop and Scheffman
1983).
Assumptions of the Model
The model developed herein is based on several assumptions. First, the fishing in-
dustries in two countries produce from separate fish stocks, and their fisheries prod-
ucts are perfect substitutes in the international market. Second, countries have mar-
ket power since there is an international duopoly in the first period and the potential
for an international monopoly in the second period. Third, the country that uses a
harvest policy to regulate its fishing industry can also use this policy to engage in
strategic behavior through the international market. In this section, these assump-
tions are discussed conceptually and through real-world examples in order to better
understand the insights of the paper. The discussion here is intended to provide
some support for the notion that, under certain conditions, countries with well-man-
aged fisheries may have an incentive to implement conservative harvest policies, if
doing so encourages degradation or destruction of fisheries in other countries.
The first assumption—that countries produce identical products from separate
fish stocks—reflects the fact that most of the world’s traditional fisheries are now
under the exclusive jurisdiction of coastal countries. It also reflects the fact that
there is often a high degree of substitutability between fisheries products in interna-
tional markets. For example, Bose and McIlgorm (1996) conclude that there is a
high degree of substitutability between bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna in the
Japanese sashimi market. Yamamoto (1994) and Owen and Troedson (1994)
also indicate that bigeye tuna and albacore tuna have become more popular as
substitutes for bluefin tuna in Japan, since its supply has become more scarce due to
overexploitation.
While tuna fisheries provide an example of products with a high degree of sub-
stitutability in international markets, they do not necessarily provide a good ex-
ample of separate fish stocks. Another fishery that may provide a better example of
both a separate fish stock and a high degree of substitutability in international mar-
kets is the New Zealand groundfish fishery. The Food and Agriculture Organization
(1997) reports that almost all groundfish production in New Zealand (orange roughy
and hoki are the principal species) occurs within its EEZ and that there is a rela-
tively small amount of harvesting activity by other countries in the adjacent high
seas. Furthermore, the New Zealand Fishing Industry Board (1996) reports that,Ruseski 114
while New Zealand accounts for only 3% to 4% of the world’s groundfish harvest,
almost all of its production is exported to foreign markets. Therefore, the prices of
these products depend on the prices of cod, pollock, and other groundfish species
caught in the rest of the world.
The second assumption—that countries have market power—is harder to illus-
trate using a current, real-world example considering the fact that there are substi-
tutes (to a greater or lesser degree) for many fisheries products. However, one ex-
ample of at least the potential for market power could be the South Pacific skipjack
and yellowfin tuna fisheries. Campbell (1996) reports that the small countries of the
Pacific Islands Region (PIR) provided around 30% of the world tuna harvest in
1990. Campbell also indicates how, through the access fees paid by distant-water
fishing nations for access to their EEZs, there is considerable potential for PIR
countries to exercise market power in terms of the world supply of canning tuna.
The third assumption—that a country with a well-managed fishery and market
power can engage in strategic behavior—is also hard to illustrate using a current
real-world example. Nevertheless, while not an ideal example for the purpose of this
paper, such strategic behavior could someday occur in the New Zealand groundfish
fishery, and, more specifically, the hoki fishery. Hoki is a species found only in the
coastal and high-seas waters around the South Island of New Zealand, the south
coast of Australia, and Tasmania. The Food and Agriculture Organization (1997) re-
ports that New Zealand accounted for over 80% of the 248,000 metric ton world
hoki harvest in 1994. The Food and Agriculture Organization (1997) also reports
that, for so-called “marketing reasons,” the New Zealand hoki harvest has been con-
sistently less than the total allowable catch (TAC) in recent years.4 Even though hoki
products compete with other groundfish products in international markets, the indus-
try seems to recognize that a higher TAC leads to lower prices offered by buyers for
hoki products.
The strategic behavior analyzed in this paper could occur in the future if most of
the world’s fisheries continue to be mismanaged, while some coastal countries con-
tinue to move toward more efficient management of the fisheries within their EEZs.
During a conference on the interaction between fisheries management practices and
international trade in fisheries products, it was remarked that recent growth in ex-
ports of high-valued fisheries products has been concentrated in the aquaculture sec-
tor and well-managed fisheries. It was then noted that, “One could interpret the ...
findings to mean that coastal states with well-managed fisheries, such as New
Zealand, should encourage ongoing fisheries mismanagement in the rest of the
world in order to be left as one of the few remaining stable sources of supply” (Pa-
cific Economic Cooperation Council 1997, p. 7). How might countries with well-
managed fisheries encourage ongoing mismanagement of fisheries in the rest of the
world? This paper suggests that one possible mechanism for such strategic behavior
is through international markets for fisheries products.
Biological and Economic Characteristics
Two types of fisheries are considered in this paper: schooling and search fisheries.
These fisheries can be differentiated by their biological and economic characteris-
tics. In terms of their biological differences, Clark (1990) and Pitcher (1995) de-
scribe how certain species of fish often swim in dense schools as a defense mecha-
4 For instance, the Food and Agriculture Organization (1997) reports that the New Zealand hoki harvest
was only 174,972 metric tons, 79.4% of the TAC, in the 1995–96 fishing season.Strategic Conservation of Fisheries 115
nism against natural predation or during spawning activities. In contrast to other
species, the schooling tendency of these species often implies a natural mortality
rate that increases as the size of the fish stock decreases. This, in turn, leads to a
growth function that exhibits critical depensation: growth can become negative if
the size of the fish stock should ever fall below some critical level. Since, by defini-
tion, other species of fish do not have this schooling tendency, the natural mortality
rate for these species most often decreases as the size of the fish stock decreases.
This leads to a growth function that exhibits compensation: growth cannot become
negative as the size of the fish stock decreases. The growth function used in this pa-
per can be modified to exhibit either critical depensation or compensation by chang-
ing the numerical value of a single parameter.
Building on the models of Mason and Polasky (1994) and Clark (1973), the
sizes of the domestic and foreign fish stocks in period t are denoted by St and St
*,
respectively, for t = 1, 2. The foreign fish stock is linked from one period to the next
by the growth function St+ 1
*  =  f( St
* – yt), where yt denotes the harvest by the foreign
fishing industry. Letting r = St
* – yt, the growth function f(r) has the following prop-
erties: f(r) > r for S < r  < S; f(r) = r for r = S, S ; f(r) = 0 for r < S; f′  > 0 and f″  < 0
for S ≤  r ≤   S . The fish stock is assumed to lie between S and S  initially. It is also
assumed that the harvest cannot exceed the size of the fish stock such that St
* ≥  yt or
r ≥  0. Similarly, the growth function for the domestic fish stock is St+ 1 = f(St – xt),
where xt denotes the harvest by the domestic fishing industry, and, therefore, has the
same properties as the growth function for the foreign fish stock.5
Think of S  as the natural, unexploited size of the domestic and foreign fish
stocks, and S as the critical minimum stock size. If the remaining stock of fish minus
harvest should fall below S in any period, then biological collapse of the fishery will
occur in the next period. In the case of schooling fisheries, it is assumed that S > 0
to reflect the potential for biological collapse due to critical depensation in the
growth function. In the case of search fisheries, it is assumed, instead, that S = 0 due
to compensation in the growth function. An illustration of the properties of the
growth function for the case of schooling fisheries is provided in figure 1. The prop-
erties of the growth function for the case of search fisheries are illustrated instead if
S = 0, which would then make this figure the same as figure 1 in Clark (1973).
In terms of their economic differences, Neher (1990) describes how it is rela-
tively more difficult to harvest from a search fishery than from a schooling fishery,
because nonschooling species have a tendency to spread out over their fishing
grounds. This tendency implies that the density of fish increases as the size of the
fish stock increases. This, in turn, implies that the harvest cost function for a search
fishery depends on the size of the fish stock—the larger the fish stock, the lower the
cost per unit of harvest.6  For schooling fisheries, however, the cost per unit of har-
vest need not depend on the size of the fish stock, since the density of fish in indi-
vidual schools does not depend as much on the size of the fish stock.7
The cost function in the domestic fishery is assumed to be C(xt) = c(xt)xt for a
5 The growth function used in this paper is just a two-period version of the recursive stock-recruitment
relation in Clark (1990) that has been modified to allow for biological collapse of the fishery between
one period and the next.
6 A similar discussion in Clark (1990) emphasizes how differences in “concentration profiles” between
species leads to different harvest cost functions. Wilen (1985) provides an alternative formulation of the
harvest cost function for a search fishery in which the cost of time spent “searching” and the cost of
time spent “fishing” are distinguished.
7 Paradoxically, Pitcher (1995) and Mackinson, Sumaila, and Pitcher (1997) describe how the cost per
unit of harvest for some schooling fisheries could actually decrease as the size of the fish stock de-
creases. This is because the behavioral response to stock decline often involves a reduction in the range
over which schools travel, with no significant reduction in the average school size.Ruseski 116
schooling fishery, such that the cost per unit of harvest is c(xt), and, following Ma-
son and Polasky (1997), C(xt, St) = [c(xt) + d(St)]xt for a search fishery, such that the
cost per unit of harvest is c(xt) + d(St), where c′  > 0, c″  ≥  0, d′  < 0, and d″  ≥  0. The
cost function in the foreign fishery is assumed to be C*(yt) = c*(yt)yt for a schooling
fishery, such that the cost per unit of harvest is c*(yt), and C*(yt,  St
*) = [c*(yt) + d*( St
*)]yt
for a search fishery, such that the cost per unit of harvest is c*(yt) + d*( St
*), where c*′  > 0,
c* ≥  0, d*′  < 0, and d*″  ≥  0. It is natural to assume that, for sufficiently small (but
positive) stock sizes, the additional terms d(St) and d( St
*) would become large
enough for further exploitation of the search fishery to become unprofitable.
These biological and economic differences between schooling fisheries and
search fisheries can lead to striking results for the subgame perfect equilibrium har-
vest policy chosen by the domestic country in the first period of the two-period
model developed in this paper. In the following section, the assumption of a nonzero
minimum critical size of the foreign fish stock implies that the domestic country
may choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period if it can induce biologi-
cal collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. In the section on search fish-
eries, the assumption of stock-dependent unit harvesting costs in the foreign fishery
implies that the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in
the first period in order to raise the foreign cost per unit of harvest in the second
period. In the case of schooling fisheries, while there may or may not be sufficient
incentive for the domestic country to induce biological collapse of the foreign fish-
ery, in the case of search fisheries, there is always this incentive.
Schooling Fisheries
Throughout this section, it is assumed that biological collapse of the domestic fish-
ery in the second period cannot occur. This is because either efficient management
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of the domestic fishery implies that there will always be a domestic harvest in the
second period, or because the initial size of the domestic fish stock is large enough
to ensure a domestic harvest in the second period, or both. However, it is assumed
that biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period can occur. This is
because inefficient management of the foreign fishery need not imply that there will
be a foreign harvest in the second period, or that the initial size of the foreign fish
stock is not large enough to ensure a foreign harvest in the second period, or both.
This assumption can be justified in the sense that the foreign fishery may have been
under an inefficient management regime before the two periods examined here, or
that the foreign fishery may have been exploited noncooperatively by several other
countries before the two periods examined here.
In the two-stage, two-period model, the second period is linked to the first pe-
riod through the effects of domestic and foreign harvests in the first period on the
sizes of domestic and foreign fish stocks in the second period. Furthermore, in each
period the second stage is linked to the first stage through the effects of the domes-
tic harvest policy in the first stage on domestic and foreign harvests in the second
stage. The model is solved for the subgame perfect equilibrium domestic harvest
policy and harvest by domestic and foreign fishing industries in each period using
the method of backward induction. Thus, consider first the second stage of the sec-
ond period. The firms in the domestic fishing industry take the domestic harvest
policy and the foreign harvest in this period as given, and the firms in the foreign
fishing industry take the domestic harvest in this period as given. Using p(xt + yt) to
denote the world inverse demand curve (or the world price) for the fishery product
in period t, such that p′  < 0, the total profit of the domestic fishing industry in this
period is
Π 22 2 2 2 2 =+ − − [( ) ( ) ] px y cx t x (1)
where t2 denotes the domestic harvest policy in the second period, t2 > 0 implies a
harvest tax, and t2 < 0 implies a harvest subsidy. Using π 2 to denote the profit per
unit of harvest, competition between domestic firms implies that the domestic har-
vest is determined by the condition
π 22 22 2 0 =+ −− = px y cx t () ( ) . (2)
If there is no biological collapse of the foreign fishery such that S2
* > 0, then compe-
tition between foreign firms implies that the foreign harvest is determined by the
condition
π 22 2 2 2 0 ** () ( ) . =+ − = px  y  c  y                      (3)
If there is biological collapse of the foreign fishery such that S2
* = 0, then there is no
foreign harvest in the second period. These conditions determine the equilibrium do-
mestic and foreign harvests x2(t2) and y2(t2) in the second period as functions of the
domestic harvest policy in the second period. What are the effects of the domestic
harvest policy chosen in the first stage on the domestic and foreign harvest in the
second stage? Totally differentiating equations (2) and (3), respectively,
πππ 22 22 2 2 22 2 0 xyt dx dy dt ++= (4)
πππ 22 22 2 2 22 2 0 ***
xyt dx dy dt ++=Ruseski 118
where  π 2 2 x  p′  – c′  < 0, = π 2 2
*
y  = p′  – c*′  < 0, π 2 2 t  = –1, π 2 2
*
t  = 0, and π 2 2 y =  π 2 2
*
x  = p′  < 0.
As long as there is a foreign harvest in the second period, using the result that
Dp c p c p xy yx ≡−= ′ − ′′ −′ − ′ > ππ ππ 22 22
2
22 22 0 ** * () ( ) ( ) (5)























2 0 ≡= −
′
> . (7)
If there is no foreign harvest in the second period, then it is obvious that  y t 2 2 = y2 = 0,
and it can also be shown that  x t 2 2  = (p′  – c′ )–1 < 0.
These results indicate that the domestic harvest decreases as the domestic har-
vest policy becomes more conservative (as t2 increases), and, as long as there is a
foreign harvest, the foreign harvest increases as the domestic harvest policy be-
comes more conservative. The more conservative the harvest policy (the greater the
tax per unit of harvest), the lower the domestic harvest. Also, the lower the domestic
harvest, the greater the world price of the fishery product and the greater the foreign
harvest. On the one hand, the effect of the domestic harvest policy on the domestic
harvest implies that there is a direct efficiency-inducing role of the domestic harvest
policy in the second period. On the other hand, the effect of the domestic harvest
policy on the foreign harvest implies that there is also a strategic role of the domes-
tic harvest policy in the second period, to enable the domestic country to raise its
surplus from fishing through rent-shifting in the international market. These direct
and strategic roles of the domestic harvest policy in the second period are examined
next.
Consider the first stage of the second period. Subgame perfection implies that
the domestic country anticipates the equilibrium in the second stage and chooses its
harvest policy to maximize domestic surplus from fishing in the second period,8
Gt xt yt t txt 22 2 22 22 2 2 22 () () , () , () . = [] + {} π (8)
Taking the total derivative of equation (8) yields
Gt x x y x t tx t y t t 22 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 2 22 2 2 2 2 1 =+ + + ++ [] [ ] ππ π π (9)
8 From equation (1), the profit of the domestic fishing industry in the second period is equal to economic
rent from fishing, [p(x2 + y2) –c(x2)]x2, minus government revenue from the harvest policy, t2x2. In equa-
tion (8), domestic surplus from fishing is defined as the profit of the domestic fishing industry plus gov-
ernment revenue from the harvest policy. This contribution of government revenue to domestic surplus
cancels out with its deduction from the profit of the domestic fishing industry. Thus, choosing the do-
mestic harvest policy to maximize domestic surplus from fishing in equation (8) is equivalent to choos-
ing the domestic harvest policy to maximize domestic economic rent from fishing. Furthermore, equa-
tion (8) implicitly assumes that the domestic government understands how domestic surplus (or domes-
tic economic rent) from fishing depends on the domestic harvest policy, through its direct and strategic
effects on domestic and foreign harvests, shown in equations (6) and (7).Strategic Conservation of Fisheries 119
= tx x p c x xpy tt t 22 2 2 2 2 22 2 + ′ − ′ + ′ () . (10)












0 =− ′ − ′ −
′
> () . (11)
The first term in this expression represents the direct role of the domestic harvest
policy to induce efficient domestic harvesting in the second period. The second term
represents the strategic role of the domestic harvest policy to raise domestic surplus
from fishing through the world price in the second period. Taking into account the
minus signs, the first term is positive (indicating a harvest tax), and the second term
is negative (indicating a harvest subsidy). However, it can be shown that the direct
role of the domestic harvest policy dominates the strategic role, and the optimal
policy in the second period is a (positive) harvest tax.9 A similar result is derived by
Dixit (1984) in his reciprocal markets model of export policies with any number of
domestic and foreign firms, and is described by Brander (1995) as the standard
terms of trade argument for government intervention in the presence of international
market power. Think of the optimal domestic harvest policy shown in equation (11)
as the “static optimum” in the second period.
Consider next the second stage of the first period. Once again, the firms in the
domestic fishing industry take the domestic harvest policy and the foreign harvest in
this period as given, and the firms in the foreign fishing industry take the domestic
harvest in this period as given. Competition between domestic firms implies that the
domestic harvest in the first period is, again, determined by the condition that aver-
age profit per unit of harvest is zero,
π 11 11 1 0 =+ −− = px y cx t () ( ) (12)
the foreign harvest in the first period is, again, determined by the similar condition,
π 11 1 1 0 ** () ( ) =+ − = px y c y (13)
and the effects of the domestic harvest policy on the domestic and foreign harvests
in the first period are the same as those in the second period shown in equations (6)
and (7). Moreover, as in the second period, the effect of the domestic harvest policy
on the domestic harvest shown in equation (6) implies that there is a direct effi-
ciency-inducing role of the domestic harvest policy in the first period. However, the
effect of the domestic harvest policy on the foreign harvest shown in equation (7), and
the potential effect of the foreign harvest in the first period on the size of the foreign fish
stock in the second period, implies that there are also two strategic roles of the domestic
harvest policy in the first period. They are: (i) to raise domestic surplus from fishing
through the international market in the first period; and (ii) to induce even more for-
eign overfishing in the first period through the international market, thereby further
raising domestic surplus from fishing in the second period. These direct and strate-
gic roles of the domestic harvest policy in the first period are examined next.
9 Substituting equations (6) and (7) into equation (11) and rearranging yields  tx p c p c x c 22 2 = ′ ′ ′ − ′ + ′
** () ,
which is unambiguously positive.Ruseski 120
Consider the first stage of the first period. Subgame perfection implies that
the domestic country anticipates the equilibrium in the second stage of this pe-
riod, and it also anticipates the equilibrium in the second period. This means
that the domestic country takes into account the effect of its harvest policy in
the first period on the size of the foreign fish stock in the second period
through its effect on the foreign harvest in the first period. The more conserva-
tive the domestic harvest policy in the first period, the greater the equilibrium
foreign harvest in the first period and the lower the size of the foreign fish
stock in the second period. Since the second period equilibrium depends on
whether or not biological collapse of the foreign fishery occurs, there are three
possible cases to consider. The first of these is that the equilibrium foreign har-
vest in the first period is never large enough to result in biological collapse of
the foreign fishery, no matter how conservative the domestic harvest policy in
the first period is relative to the static optimum. The second possibility is that,
even if the domestic harvest policy is no more conservative than the static opti-
mum in the first period, the equilibrium foreign harvest in the first period is
large enough to result in biological collapse of the foreign fishery. The third
and most interesting possibility is that, for a sufficiently conservative domestic
harvest policy in the first period relative to the static optimum, the equilibrium
foreign harvest in the first period is large enough to bring about biological col-
lapse of the foreign fishery.
The first two possibilities are not particularly interesting, since in both cases the











=− ′ − ′ −
′
() (14)
which is the same as the static optimum in the second period shown in equation
(11). The only difference between the first and second possible cases is the presence
or absence of the foreign fishery in the second period. However, the third possibility
indicates that, under certain circumstances, the domestic country may face a tradeoff
between domestic surplus in the first period and domestic surplus in the second pe-
riod. On the one hand, choosing the domestic harvest policy in equation (14) leads
to the maximum level of domestic surplus in the first period, but also accommodates
a foreign harvest in the second period. On the other hand, choosing a sufficiently
conservative harvest policy relative to that in equation (14) leads to relatively lower
domestic surplus in the first period, but also results in biological collapse of the for-
eign fishery and a world monopoly for the domestic fishing industry in the second
period.
Let  tt
e denote the static optimum for period t shown in equations (11) and (14).
Let tm
1  denote the domestic harvest policy in the first period that is just conservative
enough to induce biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period, and
let tm
2  = –x2(p′  – c′ ) denote the domestic harvest policy in the second period if there
is a world monopoly for the domestic fishing industry in the second period. In this
case, it is assumed that tt me
11 >  and Sy e
11
* −  ≥  S and Sy m
11
* −  < S, where  ye
1 and  ym
1
denote the corresponding equilibrium foreign harvests in the first period. These in-
equalities mean that biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period
can only occur if the domestic country chooses the conservative harvest policy, tm
1 ,
instead of the static optimum, tt
e, in the first period. Then the subgame perfect
equilibrium for schooling fisheries involves the domestic country choosing one of
two harvest policy regimes: (t1, t2) = (, ) tt ee
12  or (t1, t2) = (, ) tt mm
12 . The domestic coun-Strategic Conservation of Fisheries 121
try chooses between these harvest policy regimes by determining which one yields
the maximum present value of domestic surplus from fishing,
Gt t x t y t t t x t x t y t t t x t ( , ) ( ), ( ), ( ) ( ), ( ), ( ) 12 111 11 1 1 11 2 22 22 2 2 22 = [] + {} + [] + {} πδ π (15)
where δ  represents the domestic discount factor between periods. Whether or not the
domestic country has enough incentive to induce biological collapse of the foreign
fishery in this case depends on the initial sizes of the domestic and foreign fish
stocks and the domestic discount factor. This section concludes by providing the fol-
lowing proposition that strategic conservation by the domestic country in the first
period to induce biological collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period can
occur in subgame perfect equilibrium. The proof of this proposition is similar to the
proof of the first proposition in Mason and Polasky (1994).
PROPOSITION 1  For the case of schooling fisheries, in subgame perfect equilib-
rium, the domestic country chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first period rela-
tive to the static optimum for sufficiently small initial sizes of the foreign fish stock.
PROOF  Let  xe
1  be the first period equilibrium harvest by the domestic fishing in-
dustry if the domestic country chooses the domestic harvest policy te
1 . Then, the first
period equilibrium harvest by the foreign fishing industry is  ye
1 , and, assuming bio-
logical collapse does not occur, the size of the foreign fish stock in the second pe-
riod is determined by S2
* =  fS y e () *
11 − . If biological collapse of the foreign fishery
does not occur, it must be that Sy e
11
* −  ≥  S. However, there exists a critical level of
S1
* such that Sy e
11
* −  = S, and the foreign fishery is on the verge of biological col-
lapse. At this critical size of the foreign fish stock, if the domestic country decreases
its harvest policy in the first period infinitesimally below te
1 , then the domestic
country induces just enough foreign overfishing in the first period to result in bio-
logical collapse of the foreign fishery in the second period. Doing so leads to a dis-
continuous increase in the present value of domestic surplus from fishing, since
there would be only an infinitesimal decrease in domestic surplus in the first period.
However, there would also be a world monopoly for the domestic fishing industry in
the second period. For this critical size of the foreign fish stock, the domestic coun-
try would choose the conservative harvest policy over the static optimum for the
first period in subgame perfect equilibrium.
Search Fisheries
For search fisheries, since S = 0, and unit harvesting costs decrease with the size of
the fish stock, there is no potential for biological collapse of the foreign fishery, but
there is potential for economic collapse. Depletion of the foreign fish stock in the
first period could raise the foreign cost per unit of harvest in the second period
enough for it to become unprofitable for there to be a foreign harvest in that period.
This leads to the possibility that the domestic country may choose a harvest policy
in the first period that is conservative enough to induce just enough foreign over-
fishing in the first period to result in economic collapse of the foreign fishing indus-
try in the second period. In this section, however, a less dramatic outcome is consid-
ered in which it is shown that the domestic country always chooses a conservative
harvest policy in the first period to induce even more foreign overfishing in the first
period, whether or not it results in economic collapse of the foreign fishing industry
in the second period.Ruseski 122
Consider first the second stage of the second period. The profit of the domestic
fishing industry is now
=+ − −− [] ∏ px y cx dS t x () ( ) ( ) 22 2 2 2 2 2 (16)
and the domestic harvest is determined by the similar condition
π 22 222 2 0 =+ −−− = px y cx dS t () ( ) ( ) . (17)
The foreign harvest in this period is determined by the condition
π 22 2 2 2 0 ** * * () ( ) ( ) . =+ − − = px y c y d S (18)
These equations determine the equilibrium domestic and foreign harvests x2(S2,  S2
*,
t2) and y2(S2,  S2
*, t2) in the second period as functions of the sizes of the domestic
and foreign fish stocks and the domestic harvest policy in the second period. The ef-
fects of the domestic harvest policy and the domestic and foreign fish stocks in the
second period are determined by totally differentiating equations (17) and (18), re-
spectively,
πππππ 22 22 22 22 2 2 22222 0 xySSt dx dy dS dS dt ++++= *
* (19)
πππππ 22 22 22 22 2 2 22222 0 **** * *
* xySSt dx dy dS dS dt ++++=
where  π 2 2 x , π 2 2
* , y π 2 2 y , π 2 2
* , x π 2 2 t , π 2 2
* , t  and D are the same as before and π 2 2 S = –d ′  > 0,
π 2 2
*
* S  = –d*′  > 0, and π 2 2 S*  = π 2 2
*
S  = 0. While  x t 2 2  and  y t 2 2 are the same as in
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These comparative static results indicate that the domestic harvest in the second
period increases, while the foreign harvest in the second period decreases with the
size of the domestic fish stock in the second period. On the one hand, the greater the
size of the domestic fish stock, the lower the domestic cost per unit of harvest, and
the higher the domestic harvest. On the other hand, the greater the domestic harvest,
the lower the world price of the fishery product, and the lower the foreign harvest.
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These four comparative static results do not influence the choice of domestic harvest
policy in the second period, but they influence the choice of domestic harvest policy
in the first period. As in the case of the schooling fishery, the effects of the domestic
harvest policy on the domestic and foreign harvests shown in equations (6) and (7)
imply that there is a direct role and a strategic role of the domestic harvest policy in
the second period that do not depend on the size of the domestic or foreign fish
stock. These roles are examined next.
Consider the first stage of the second period. The objective of the domestic gov-
ernment is to choose the level of domestic harvest in order to maximize domestic
surplus in this period,
GSSt xSSt ySSt St txSSt 222 2 2 222 2 222 2 2 2 2222 2 (, ,) (, ,) , (, ,) , , (, ,) ** * * = [] + {} π (24)
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though the optimal domestic harvest policy is now written on the left-hand side as
an explicit function of the domestic and foreign stock sizes in the second period.
Consider next the second stage of the first period. Once again, the firms in the
domestic fishing industry take the domestic harvest policy and the foreign harvest in
this period as given, and the firms in the foreign fishing industry take the domestic
harvest in this period as given. Competition between domestic firms implies that the
domestic harvest in the first period is, again, determined by the condition that aver-
age profit per unit of harvest is zero,
π 11 111 1 0 =+ −−− = px y cx dS t () ( ) ( ) (26)
the foreign harvest in the first period is, again, determined by the similar condition,
π 11 1 1 1 0 ** * * () ( ) ( ) =+ − − = px y c y d S (27)
and the equilibrium domestic and foreign harvests in the first period are x1(S1, S1
*, t1)
and y1(S1, S1
*, t1). The effects of the domestic harvest policy on the domestic and foreign
harvests in the first period are still the same as those shown in equations (6) and (7).
However, given the comparative static results shown in equations (20), (21), (22), and
(23), and given the growth functions for the domestic and foreign fish stocks, since the
domestic harvest policy affects the domestic and foreign harvests in the first period, it
also affects the domestic and foreign harvests in the second period. These first and
second period effects imply that there are now several direct and strategic roles of
the domestic harvest policy in the first period. These roles are examined next.
Consider the first stage of the first period. Subgame perfection implies that the
domestic country anticipates the equilibrium in the second stage of this period, and
that it also anticipates the equilibrium in the second period. This means that the do-
mestic country takes into account the effect of its harvest policy in the first period
on the size of the domestic and foreign fish stocks in the second period through its
effect on the domestic and foreign harvests in the first period. The more conserva-
tive the domestic harvest policy in the first period, the lower (greater) the equilib-
rium domestic (foreign) harvest in the first period, the greater (lower) the size of theRuseski 124
domestic (foreign) fish stock in the second period, and the lower (greater) the cost
per unit of domestic (foreign) harvest in the second period. For search fisheries,
since second period equilibrium always depends on the sizes of the domestic and
foreign fish stocks in the second period, there is always an incentive for the domes-
tic country to choose a conservative harvest policy in the first period relative to the
static optimum derived above.
Given the equilibrium harvests in the second stage of the first period, x1(S1,  S1
*, t1)
and y1(S1,  S1
*, t1), the domestic country chooses the first period harvest policy that
yields the maximum present value of domestic surplus from fishing,
GS S S S t (, , , ,) **
11 221   = [] + {} π 1 1111 1111 1 1 11111 xSSt ySSt St txSSt ( ,, ) ,( ,, ) ,, ( ,, ) ** * (28)
+ [] + {} δπ 2222 222 2222 222 222 xSS ySS StSS tSS xSS (, ) , (, ) , ,(, ) (, ) (, ) ** * **
subject to S2 = f[S1 – x1(S1,  S1
*, t1)] and Sf S y S S t 21 1 1 1 1
** * (, ,) =− [] . Taking the de-
rivative of equation (28) with respect to t1 yields
Gt x x y x t x S x t tx t y t t S x t 1 11 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 =+ + + +++ + [] [ ] [ ] ππ π π δ π (29)
++ + + + δπ π π π [] 2 22 222 2 2 2 1 2 22 22 2 2 2 2 1 1 xS yS S t S S x t xy t t S x x
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which can be simplified and rearranged to yield the optimal domestic harvest policy
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Once again, the first term in equation (31) represents the direct role of the domestic
harvest policy to induce static efficiency in the first period. The second term repre-
sents the strategic role of the domestic harvest policy to raise domestic surplus from
fishing through the world price in the first period. These two terms taken together
are just the usual static optimum in the first period. The third term represents the di-
rect role of the domestic harvest policy to induce dynamic efficiency in the first pe-
riod; the lower the domestic harvest in the first period, the larger the size of the do-
mestic fish stock and the lower the domestic cost per unit of harvest in the second
period. Finally, the last term represents the strategic role of the domestic harvest
policy to induce foreign overfishing in the first period; the lower the domestic har-
vest in the first period, the larger the foreign harvest in the first period, the smaller
the size of the foreign fish stock and the larger the foreign cost per unit of harvest in
the second period. This enables the domestic country to even further raise its surplus
from fishing through the world price in the second period.Strategic Conservation of Fisheries 125
Since the last two terms in equation (31) are both positive, it is clear that the
subgame perfect equilibrium harvest policy is larger (more conservative) than the
static optimum in the first period. The opportunity for the domestic country to raise
its surplus from fishing at the expense of the foreign fishing industry in the second
period always provides an incentive for the domestic country to choose a conserva-
tive harvest policy in the first period, even if economic collapse of the foreign fish-
ery in the second period cannot occur. These results prove the following proposition
that summarizes this result.
PROPOSITION 2   For the case of search fisheries, in subgame perfect equilibrium
the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first period
relative to the static optimum, regardless of the initial size of the foreign fish stock.
Summary and Extensions
This paper has suggested that fisheries trade in the presence of international market
power and divergent national fisheries management regimes could have unexpected
consequences for world fisheries. The results of the two-stage, two-period model de-
veloped here were based on the assumption that two countries have international
market power and an identical fisheries product at the level of their fishing indus-
tries. The results were also based on the assumption that the domestic country uses a
harvest policy in each period to regulate its fishing industry, while the foreign fish-
ing industry is unregulated. Two types of fisheries were considered. In the case of
schooling fisheries, it was found that the domestic country may choose a conserva-
tive harvest policy in the first period if it can induce biological collapse of the for-
eign fishery in the second period. In the case of search fisheries, it was found that
the domestic country always chooses a conservative harvest policy in the first pe-
riod, even if it cannot induce economic collapse of the foreign fishing industry in
the second period.
An important extension to the model developed in this paper would be to as-
sume that the product of the domestic and foreign fishing industries is consumed in
domestic and foreign markets instead of the international market. The potential deg-
radation or destruction of the foreign fishery in the second period would then have a
negative impact on consumer surplus in the domestic market for the fishery product.
In this case, depending on whether the domestic country imports or exports the fish-
ery product, the domestic country could choose a harvest policy in the first period
that induces either the strategic enhancement (or preservation) of the foreign fishery
in the second period or its strategic degradation (or destruction). Another important
extension that follows from the previous extension would be to allow for the possi-
bility of strategic behavior by the foreign country in the form of trade policy (such
as an export quota, an import quota, or a tariff, depending on whether the foreign
country imports or exports the fishery product) in response to strategic regulation of
the domestic fishing industry.10 In this case, the possibility of retaliation by the for-
eign country would have to be taken into account by the domestic country when it
chooses its harvest policy.
10 As noted in footnote 2, inefficient management of the foreign fishery could be the result of prohibi-
tively high management and enforcement costs. However, the foreign country could still resort to trade
policy as an indirect tool for regulation of the foreign fishing industry and as a strategic tool in its trade
relations with the domestic country.Ruseski 126
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